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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
LEO A. BIRD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
6333

CLOVER LEAF-HARRIS DAIRY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Leo A. Bird, the plaintiff and respondent in this case,
commenced suit on the above entitled action in the City
Court of Salt Lake City. The action was tried before
Judge Bryan P. Leverich, sitting without a jury. After a
judgment for plaintiff as prayed, the appellant appealed
to the Third Judicial District Court where the same was
tried de novo before Judge Herbert M. Schiller, sitting
without a jury. Plaintiff again obtained a judgment as
prayed.
The facts as established by the pleadings and evidence
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are very simple. The appellant by its pleadings admitted
the following matters: 1. The jurisdictional facts; 2. The
ownership and occupancy of the buildings known as the
Clover Leaf-Harris Dairy, located at 723 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah; 3. Plaintiff's son, Montell
Bird, visited defendant's plant and worked as a milk
sampler, and that he was an invitee while pursuing such
activity; 4. That said plaintiff's son parked plaintiff's car,
on the 6th day of March, 1939, on defendant's premises and
under a projection attached to the north wall of one of
defendant's buildings-the building in question; 5. That
a portion of said north wall fell and collapsed upon the
said automobile and that by reason thereof, dama.ge was
sustained by plaintiff, and the damage was stipulated to be
$633.77. The evidence further reduced the issues to the
following matters, namely: 1. Whether or not the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is applicable under the facts alleged
and proven; and 2. The status occupied by Montell Bird,
plaintiff's son, while he was on the premises of the defendant
Dairy.
Appellant's brief is so replete with misstatements of
the evidence, and statements purporting to be facts but
which are not supported by the evidence, all of which may
influence the court on matters not involved in the case
that respondent feels constrained to point out a few of these
incongruities, and in connection therewith respondent incorporates herein, to further reflect the misstatements of
appellant, the findings of fact by the court:
The caus.e having come on regularly for trial on the
21st day of March, 1940, Robert S. Spooner appearing as
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counsel for plaintiff, and Thatcher & Young appearing as
counsel for defendant; a trial by jury having been waived
by counsel for the respective parties, the cause was tried
by the Honorable Herbert M. Schiller who found the following facts :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That the plaintiff is, and at all times hereinafter
mentioned was, a resident of Salt Lake City and County,
State of Utah; that the Clover Leaf-Harris Dairy is, and
at all times hereinafter mentioned was, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of
the State of Utah with its principal place of business in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

2. That on or about the 6th day of March, 1939, the
plaintiff was the owner of a 1938 Studebaker Sedan automobile. That on the date aforesaid the defendant owned and
occupied all the buildings known as the Clover Leaf-Harris
Dairy and which were and are located at 723 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. That on the date aforesaid,
and for more than a year prior thereto, plaintiff's son,
Montell Bird, was regularly employed by the Federated
Milk Producer's Association, and that on said date was
working for said Association at the defendant's Dairy with
the consent, approval and permission of the defendant.
3. That on or about the 6th day of March, 1939, said
Montell Bird had borrowed the plaintiff's automobile for
the purpose of going to work at Defendant's Dairy, and
that such use and bailment was for the sole benefit of
Montell Bird and not for the use or benefit of the plaintiff;
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and that the said Montell Bird on the date aforesaid parked
the plaintiff's automobile along side the north wall of a
building owned and occupied by the defendant, and at a
place where others had parked their automobiles.
4. That on the date aforesaid, and while plaintiff's
automobile was parked along side the north wall of defendant's building which was 125 feet long and two stories
in height, and which was an instrumentality peculiarly,
exclusively and completely within the control and management of the said defendant, and while the plaintiff's automobile was parked by the aforesaid wall with the consent
and permission of the defendant, the said wall collapsed
and fell down and upon plaintiff's car. That the defendant
knew or should have known of the unsafe and unsound
condition of said wall and that the damage to plaintiff's
automobile was proximately caused as a result of the careless and negligent maintenance of said wall in an uns.ound
and unsafe and dangerous condition. That as a direct and
proximate result of the careless and negligent maintenance
of an unsafe, unsound and dangerous wall which fell and
collapsed upon plaintiff's automobile, plaintiff suffered
damages. to his said automobile in the sum of $633.77.

1

On page 2, appellant's statements, that, "The space
between the garage and shop is reserved exclusively for
company trucks entering and leaving the garage and for
making necessary repairs," and, "This was reserved for
entrance to the garage," are apparently designed to influence the court to believe that every one who came on the
premises was immediately aware of this "exclusive" reservation of space for company trucks either by signs posted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
or by oral or written notice actually given. This is not
supported by the evidence in any particular. There is no
evidence that Montell Bird had notice, actual or constructive, of this "exclusive" parking area. Again, on page 3,
appellant states, "Certain employees sometimes left their
cars under the east canopy. However, it was in violation
of positive rules announced both orally and by written notice
posted on walls, and also printed bills which were at times
placed in offending cars." It is true employees did park
their cars in this "exclusive" area, and appellant's evidence
is that notices were posted, not in this area, but on an
employee's bulletin board, but there is no evidence that
printed bills were ever placed in offending cars.
At the first trial there was no mention of a Mr. Meyers,
a company representative, assisting in the routine inspection three months prior to the collapse of the wall. It was
never claimed that Mr. Meyers is a building expert or came
for the purpose of an inspection. However, it seems to us
that had Mr. Meyers been present this fact would have been
established at the first trial.
On pages 4, 9 and 11, appellant refers to the plaintiff's
son as Leo Montell Bird. Leo A. Bird is the plaintiff and
Leo Montell Bird is his son, and it was Montell Bird who
worked at defendant's premises and parked the plaintiff's
car. No evidence was offered to show agency, actual or
implied, but on the contrary plaintiff established that
Montell Bird borrowed the car for his own use and not
for the use or benefit of Leo A. Bird, the plaintiff.
There is no evidence that "no company officiaJ or em.ployee saw Montell drive plaintiff's car there (by the wall
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in question)." There is: some evidence, however, that Mr.
Gallagher and Mr. Johnson were not aware of the presence
of the car.
ARGUMENT
Appellant devotes the major portion of its brief admitting Montell Bird was an invitee on its premises until
he parked a Studebaker automobile by the north wall of a
particular building and at that moment he became a trespasser or licensee, consequently eliminating the possibility
of liability unless the company committed wilful or wanton
acts of destruction upon the car.
Appellant admits that Mantell Bird had the right to
enter its premises. and work in its plant. He had an express
invitation to enter for a purpose connected with the business
in which the Dairy was engaged. The appellant further
concedes that he could park a car in the rear of the plant
and leaving this area walk past the building in question to
reach his destination without losing his personality as an
invitee. Further narrowing appellant's own position, it is
apparent in all parts of the brief and the transcript that
appellant had no objection to Mr. Bird riding his bicycle
onto the premises and placing it inside the garage directly
ahead of where the car was parked. The evidence shows
that he sometimes rode a bicycle to work and when he did
he placed it there. The evidence for plaintiff tends to show
that Mantell drove a Chevrolet Coupe which he bought after
the accident, this was in April, 1939. So when appellant
says Mantell drove a F'ord Coupe, he means. a Chevrolet
Coupe. Mr. Johnson, a witness for appellant, testified he
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had seen Montell in a Chevrolet Coupe in the vicinity of
this garage and that he had not admonished him on his
parking habits. Mantell Bird did testify that he had parked
plaintiff's car at various places. Sometimes it was parked
in the lot, sometimes along the south part of the driveway
and the west side of the garage in question where cars
were permitted to be parked by appellant's evidence, and
sometimes where it was parked on the day in question.
Now appellant's counsel says that respondent's position is
absurd, but consider the palpable inconsistencies and unreasonableness of their argument. They say, if Montell Bird
had walked to work, entered appellant's premises and
walked back by the garage, which is about fifteen feet
from where he engaged in his activities, and the wall fell
on him, he would have been an invitee; if he rode his
bicycle to work and placed it inside the garage immediately
ahead of the space where the Studebaker was parked, and
was in the act of leaving the garage when the wall fell on
him, he would have been an invitee, as Johnson, a witness
for appellant, on page 43 of Transcript of testimony testified
this was not objectionable; again, if he parked in the rear
parking area and was passing the garage on his way to work
(which he would necessarily have to do) when the wall
. fell on him, he would have been an invitee; and to go further, if he parked along the south side of the driveway
or the west part of the garage wall, walked around to the
north section of the same building, and the wall fell on
him, he still would have been an invitee, for Johnson again
testified, Transcript of testimony p. 42, that this parking was
not objectionable, but when Mr. Bird parked plaintiff's car
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where he had parked before on several occasions, and where
employee's cars were parked at the time, he became a trespasser! Whatever mental legerdemain appellant's counsel
employed to arrive at this startling conclusion I fail to
apprehend, it certainly was not taken from legal authority.
In Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426, 31 N. E. 128, the
court holds, among other things :
To be an invitee the visitor must come onto the
premises for a purpose connected with the business
in which the occupant is engaged or which he permits to be carried on. There must be some mutuality
of interest in the subject to which the visitor's business relates, although the particular thing which is
the object of the visit may not be for the benefit of
the occupant.
The above rule covers the situation which existed in
the case at bar. Plaintiff's son was employed by the Federated Milk Producer's Association and was assigned to appellant's Dairy to. carry on his duties. He worked in such
capacity for the better part of a year and one half in an
important section of the Dairy. Every can of milk was
sampled by him for its milk and cream content. Appellant
was benefitted in that it was required to pay only such
sums as· the samples indicated they were worth in accordance with a set scale; also, precise contents of each container as to the proportions of cream and milk were ascertained, and many other benefits· not necessary to here
enumerate as appellant concedes the work was connected
with the business. Also, the uncontradicted evidence is
that Montell Bird usually had to take the samples with him
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(Tr. 28) and this would necessitate some sort of conveyance
to and from work.
The court will observe that in discussing appellant's
position I have insisted that Montell Bird was. either an
invitee or a trespasser. This contention is based upon appellant's own evidence and admission. F'or the cases show
that it is a non sequitur to say there is no knowledge or
permission of certain conduct and then say that such conduct made the actor a licensee, to be a licensee there must
be some knowledge or consent on the owner's part to the
conduct in question. He was then either an invitee or a
trespasser, and from all the admissions, evidence and. findings it certainly could not be determined that he was a
trespasser.
The Plummer case is approved in Kinsman v. Bar'ton &
Co., 141 Wash. 311, 251 Pac. 563, which held a.mong other
things:
An invitee is one who either expressly or impliedly is invited onto the premises of another in connection with the business carried on ; a licensee is
not a trespasser because he has permission to enter
for other purposes not connected with the business.
The appellant also cites Kinsman v. Barton as an authority
for its position, but upon a superficial reading of the case
it will be observed that the facts distinguish it from the
one at bar, although the general rule is adopted. In the
Kinsman case plaintiff conducted. a lunch stand business
on defendant's premises which was not in any way connected with its business and was not required to pay rent
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therefore. Plaintiff stepped in a hole, causing the injury
complained of, which was as apparent to her as it was to
the defendant. This situation, of course, is widely different
from the one at bar.

It has often been held that the duty of keeping premises
in repair and in a safe condition extends to means, of ingress
and egress which, although not the proper ways, the owner
of premises permits customers and others to use them without taking precaution to prevent such use.
Landy vs. Olson and Suley Sash & Door Co., 171
Minn. 440, 214 N. W. 659
Campbell vs. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374
Certainly the par king of cars would come under the same rule
as does walking in and out of premises. All the cases cited
by appellant are based upon facts which show that the
injury or damage caused came as a result of some affirmative act on the plaintiff's part which in turn caused. the
neglect attributed to the defendant to result in such injury
or damage. There could be no suggestion in the case at bar
that the act of parking a car had anything to do with the
collapse of the wall, as the wall would have collapsed anyway. The simple truth, as shown by the evidence and. the
tenor of appellant's brief, is, that no one cared who parked
by this garage when the trucks were out until it appeared
that plaintiff wanted reimbursement for the damage done
his car. If the parking situation was as serious as the company officials would now have the court believe certainly
8ix employees would not have had their cars parked by this
garage. Until Mr. Bird was informed not to use this area
what reason would he have not to park there?
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The brief written by appellant at the request of Judge
Schiller contained this statement, and which is again stated
on page 6 of its present brief: "Even though they (the company officials) saw the car standing there, which is denied,
yet they migh have supposed it to belong to some visiting
guest of the company officials who perchance was invited
to place his car under the canopy." Now, no one needed
to "box the boy's ears" to prevent his parking in this place,
even though Mr. Young would have the court think so. If
any one had informed him that notwithstanding employees
parked by this wall, and notwithstanding other invitees
parked there, that he was forbidden this. privilege no doubt
he would have ceased-but what reason would Montell Bird
have, or any other person similarly situated have, not to
park as he did, especially when he needed a conveyance to
carry samples?
The principle announced in Gavin vs. O'Connor, cited
by appellant is correct, but the facts distinguish it considerable from the facts in the case at bar. I cannot conceive of a way to reconcile the two cases for the facts of
cases give rise to the many principles of law. Appellant
cites, 45 C. J. at page 816 and quotes therefrom, but it
will be observed that the section does not contemplate a
situation where the person on the premises is already an
invitee by express invitation, it contemplates a situation
where plaintiff is. attempting to establish his status without
a showing of express invitation.
An invitee does not lose his status as such because of
a slight deviation from the usual course of travel or passage,
Ellington v. Rich, 102 S. E. 510, which held a deviation of
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twenty-five feet not to alter the status although it was not
necessary to go in that place.
Also see, Southeastern Portland Cement Co. v.
Bustellas, 216 S. W. 268.
In addition to the statement of appellant's counsel
relative to the case of Loney vs. Laramie Auto Company, the court said, "Nor would it seem unreasonable to
hold that the owner of premises should anticipate what is
usually and customarily done by an invitee within the scope
of, and to carry out the purpose of, the invitation." Also in
Heckman v. Sisters of Charity, cited by appellant, the
court allowed recovery primarily on the proposition that
if there is a deviation from the invitation there must be
shown to have been some notice given. by the defendant to
apprise the plaintiff of its wishes.
It is notable that the majority of the cases deal with
defects in premises which are, or should be, as obvious to
the invitee or the licensee as there are, or should be, to the
owner of the premises. In the case at bar there is. no
doubt that the defect which existed could not have been
discovered by Montell Bird without inspection of the wall.
At page 82 of the transcript of testimony, Mr. Gallagher,
manager of the Dairy, testified the inspection was a routine quarterly inspection. Witnesses for appellant testified
that they had no knowledge of a defect in the structure of
the garage. Well, certainly, had they testified otherwise
there would be no defense at all. The point is, should they
have had some knowledge of such a defect.
The owner of premises is under a positive duty not
only to exercise reasonable care to provide safe premises
but also is under a duty to discover the use or uses invitees
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are putting their premises to and use reasonable care to protect them in that extended use. Some of the cases cited
below deal with both points and others deal with only the
first mentioned.
H'interoud vs. Christensen, 68 Utah 546, 251
Pac. 360
Blanchette vs. Union Street Railway Co., 248
Mass. 407, 143 N. E. 310
Elie vs. Lewiston Railway Co., 112 Me. 178, 91
Atl. 786
Holmes vs. Drew, 151 Mass. 587, 25 N. E. 22
Hupfer vs. National Distilling Co., 114 Wis. 279,
90 N. W. 191
Pauchner vs. Wahem, 211 Ill. 276, 83 N. E. 202
Dobbie vs. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 95 Cal.
App. 781, 273 Pac. 630
Appellant's attorney's have set forth several cases dealing with licensees and trespassers, but from the admissions
made, the pleadings, the evidence, the findings, and even
the cases and argument of appellant's brief, there can be no
doubt that Mantell Bird was at all times an invitee. We
contend there never was a deviation for there never was
notice given. Further, that if notice had been given so as
to make a deviation, the deviation was not of such nature
as to cause Mantell Bird to lose his status., but notice, actual
or constructive, was never alleged nor proven.
We now come to the question of whether the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this. case. In connection
with consideration of the doctrine many of the cases. hereinafter cited supplement the question raised as to Mr. Bird's
status while he was on appellant's property for the two
propositions here raised go hand in hand in most cas.es as
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stated in appellant's brief. I call the Court's attention to
the well known and famous case of Byrne v. Bowlle, 2 H
& C. 722 Exchequer ( 1863) . In this case the plaintiff received injury when she was. struck upon the head by a
barrel which fell out of defendant's building. Plaintiff
offered no proof of negligence other than this. The court
held that the evidence showing the barrel to have hit plaintiff and that it emanated from defandant's building was
sufficient to cast the burden of proving that the barrel
fell without negligence by the defendant. To the same effect
under similar circumstances is Inland and Seaboard Coasting
Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. 8. 551.
A leading Utah case, Angerman v. Edgemon, 76 Ut.
394, 290 Pac. 169, and exhaustively treated at 79 A. L. R.
40, lays. down the law in Utah on these facts:
Plaintiff conducted a millinery shop on the
ground floor of a building leased by defendants who
conducted a hotel business on the 2nd and 3rd floors.
On the day in question a considerable flow of water
escaped from the toilet fixtures on the 3rd floor and
in due time seeped through to plaintiff's shop damaging some dresses. Plaintiff alleged general negligence and also made specific allegations of negligence.
The defendant's evidence showed that the most
modern plumbing equipment had been installed
throughout, and that, only a few days prior they had
employed skilled workmen to inspect the plumbing,
and that no defects were found, and that they did not
know what caused the water to over-flow. The plaintiff relied on the doctrine as no specific acts were
shown.
On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, the
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
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quitur applied as the plaintiff had no means of ascertaining wherein the defendants were negligent,
and notwithstanding no specific acts of negligence
were shown as alleged, and notwithstanding the evidence produced by defendants. The Court going on
the principle that such a thing does not occur in the
ordinary course of events unless there is some negligence on defendant's part in some particular.
At this point the Court's attention might be drawn to
several cases cited by appellant for the purpose of attempting to apprise the court of the limitations on the doctrine.
In Denver vs. Spencer, plaintiff alleged specific acts of
negligence and also attempted to rely on the doctrine. In
some jurisdictions the rule has been laid down that one cannot aHege specific acts of negligence and failing therein,
either to prove the same or offer proof, fall back on the doctrine for support. The matter is treated at 79 A. L. R. 40,
as above stated, and it will be seen that in Utah the plaintiff
would have recovered. Kennedy vs. Hawkins goes off on
about the same grounds and for the same reasons as the
above Colnrado case as this jurisdiction has the same rule.
However, a close consideration of the facts show that the
defendant did not have exclusive control of the things which
gave rise to the injury, and also, that other persons were instrumental in altering the conditions. In Zoccolillo vs. 0. S.
L. the court refused to apply the doctrine yet it would seem
that this case is somewhat out of line with the Utah cases decided both before and after. However, the court was particularly attracted to the proposition that neither plaintiff
nor her family registered co-mplaint with the defendant's
servants relative to the temperature of the train, and that
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had such complaint been made perhaps the plaintiff's injury
would have been avoided or greatly minimized. The Court
did however, lay down this rule, notwithstanding, "When a
thing which causes injury, without the fault of the injured
person, is shown to be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not occur if the one having such control uses
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence that t~?-e injury
arose from defendant's want of care."
In another Utah case, Dearden vs. San Pedro, 33 Utah
147, 93 Pac. 271, the Utah court applied the doctrine to a
case where a brake chain had been broken and plaintiff sustained injury when a flying switch was attempted by the
engine and water car and as a result of the broken brake
chain the cars collided with a passenger car carrying plaintiff. Also see,

Uggla vs. Brokaw, 102 N.Y. Supp. 857
It is not necessary to give proof of the owner's knowledge of the unsafe condition of the building,

Gray vs. Boston Gaslight Co., 114 Mass. 149, 19
Am. Rep. 324
Butts vs. National Exchange Bank, 72 S. W.
1083
Waterhouse vs. J os. Schlitz Brewing Co., S. Dak.
94 N. W. 587
this would necessarily have to be the rule or the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur would be a theory without possibility of
application.
The case of J. C. Penny Co. vs. Forrest, 183 Okl. 106,
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180 Pac. 2nd 640, is in line with the Angerman case and
very much like the one at bar. The facts were briefly these:
Plaintiff received injury while in the defendant's store when a merchandise carrier fell from
the overhead system used for carrage in the store.
Examination disclosed an iron casting holding a bolt
on the appliance broke which permitted the mechanism to fall upon plaintiff.
The defendant showed the system was approved
in over a thousand stores, and that an inspection
made just a week prior had disclosed no defects.
Plaintiff relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur although specific acts of negligence were
alleged.
The court applied the doctrine precisely as does
the Utah court, and further held the sufficiency of
the evidence to be a matter for the jury or the court
sitting without a jury to determine-as does the Angerman case.
In the absence of satisfactory explanation that the
falling of a building, a wall or a part thereof, was accidental,
and no showing is made as to unusual happenings or events
which caused the same to fall, the land owner is liable, Sinhovitz vs. Peters Land Co., 64 S. E. 93. The court said on
page 95, paragraph 2, "The evidence showed that a pane
of glass, without apparent cause, fell from the window of
defendant's building injuring plaintiff. The plaintiff had
the right to be where she was, and the duty was upon defendant to use ordinary and reasonable care in the construction and maintenance of the building so as not to occasion
injury-Barring human intervention-panes of glass do
not fall from windows unless the glass is either not placed
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properly in the sash at the start or unless by reason of lapse
of time the sash and glass stand in need of repair."
Appellant cites Nucek vs. Weaver which at first blush
appears to be contrary to our position, but on perusal seems
to confirm it. Without here recording the defendant's defense, I call the Court's attention thereto as compared with
the defense offered by the Dairy in the case at bar. In every
case the Court will read in connection herewith it cannot
help but be impressed by the inadequacy of the defendant's
evidence in the present case compared with those cited-and
in the cited cases the evidence was insufficient and inadequate. I think it reasonable to assume an indisposition on
the part of defendant not to offer so complete a defense but
rather to trust in some sort of divine providence to furnish
one. For if an investigation were made to determine the
cause of the collapse of this wall the findings were not offered in evidence, and if an investigation was not made then
we submit there must be some reason therefor which is
known only by the officials of the company. No act of God
was ever suggested as being the proximate cause of this accident. Normally the collapse of any structure upon one's
land would stir at least a mild interest as to the cause thereof in the landowner's mind--especially when about $4000.00
worth of damage was done to cars belonging to employees
and invitees. The Court will observe that in all cases cited
an investigation was made and the findings put in evidence
as a defense even though it was not always found to eliminate liability.
The case of N ucek vs. W·eaver and Pickwick Corp. vs.
Messinger, both cited by appellant, and several cases cited
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by respondent hold that the sufficiency of the evidence in
explanation of the accident is for the jury, or the court sitting without a jury, to decide. The ruling in the Pickwick
case shows that the issue on appeal turned on a matter of
improper instruction given by the trial judge which precluded the defendant from offering evidence which might
have explained the cause of the accident.
Mr. Justice Larson will undoubtedly be surprised at the
construction placed on part of his opinion in White vs.
Pinney, which is cited by the appellant, and which is set
out in quotation therefrom on page 17 of appellant's brief.
Most cases hold that a presumption arises from the application of the doctrine, but the Utah court has for some time
held it to be an inference which makes the doctrine effective
as an evidentiary matter. How does this alter the application of the doctrine? One line of decisions holds it to be a
rebuttable presumption, while another liAe of decisions, as
explained by Justice Larson in the Utah case, holds the
burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the defendant to show that he was not guilty of negligence. Perhaps the quantum of proof is greater under one view than
under the other, but this is the extent of divergence. The
rule announced by Justice Larson is certainly more equitable
and less onerous for it allows the defendant to produce evidence which would explain the accident, its cause, and show
the amount of care he exercised in apprehension of just such
damage. But the mere statement of this rule does not constitute evidence sufficient to meet the evidentiary inference,
there must be affirmative proof which will satisfy a jury,
or a trial judge sitting without a jury, that he has exercised
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all the care prudent men would have exercised under the
circumstances and that he has exercised all care commensurate with the damages to be apprehended. Appellant failed
utterly to offer in evidence any e~planation from which a
judge or jury could determine whether or not he had met
the requirements set up by Justice Larson.
The law is well settled in Utah, as in other states, that
the sufficiency of the evidence in explanation of the accident is for the jury, as the court sitting without a jury, to
determine considering all the evidence introduced.
Angerman vs. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394, 290 Pac.
169
Nucek vs. Weaver, 54 Pac. 2nd 768
J. C. Penney Co. vs. Forrest, 183 Okl. 106, 180
Pac. 2nd 640
There are several well considered decisions all of which
hold that buildings properly constructed and properly maintained do not fall from slight causes but only from adequate
or substantial causes, and that when a building, or a wall
thereof, does fall without apparent cause, in the absence of
explanatory circumstances, negligence will be presumed.
Mullen vs. St. John, 57 N.Y. 567
Patterson vs. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 91 N. W.
336
Jill vs. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477
W orthin vs. Goodall, 138 Mass. 533
Readman vs. Conway, 126 Mass. 374
City of Denver vs. Soloman, 31 Pac. 507
Looney vs. McLean, 129 Mass. 295
Volmar vs. Manhattan Ry. Co., 134 N. Y. 418.
There are cases of liability when buildings fall onto
other property, and which charge the landowners, with a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
positive duty to keep their premises in safe condition and
repair and to guard against structural defects which the
use of ordinary care will reflect.

Scha.riff vs. Southern Illinois Cowt. Co., 92 S. W.
126

Hudgins vs. Ham, 240 F'ed. 387-5th Circuit, 24
Minn. 501,
Respondent has never claimed, nor does he now claim, that
property owners are insurers of the safety of others and
their property which are rightfully on the premises, but
we certainly claim the protection which reasonable care
would insure and which all the decisions hold we have a
right to claim.
On page 4 of its brief appellant states that as many as
four men would get on the canopy attached to the wall and
shovel off the accumulated snow without causing indications of weakness or excessive strain. If any strain were
shown at any time from such practice the company was
put on notice that accidents might occur, and precaution
should have been taken for the safety of those who might
come in contact with this wall. Obviously, this was not
done.
The rule in Dugal vs. Peoples Bank, 34 N. E. 581, holds
that an owner of a building would be liable for negligently
allowing snow and ice to accumulate on the roof or projection and, although he may and can build any way he
pleases in accordance with municipal ordinance, and the
style adopted is not negligence per se, nevertheless, it im~
poses a greater degree of care and watchfulness to prevent
accidents as a result of such construction. The testimony
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of the plant foreman is that this canopy was put up two
years after the construction of the· building, and there is
no evidence that the building was constructed to accommodate the strain it would necessarily exert.
From a full consideration of all the cases it is evident
that appellant sums up all its evidence and defense in one
short paragraph as stated concisely on page 4 of its brief,
which says, "None of the officers or employees of the company knew anything in or about the building, or the canopy
(although this is questionable from the statement made as
to excessive strain in the paragraph just below), suggesting inherent weakness or need or repair or replacements."
Appellant's attorneys either do not wish to understand the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the cases they have read
in connection therewith or they refuse to recognize that
these many cases make sense. On page 20 of appellant's
brief its attorneys argue a set of facts entirely foreign to
this case. They even become so irritated in their distaste
for the doctrine as applied to their tautological set of facts
that they irefully condemn the rule announced by Justice
Larson which they had reveled in but a few pages before.
As has been said in ~any of the cases, walls or buildings in the ordinary course of events do not collapse or fall
down. There is some reason such as fire, earthquake, improper construction or improper maintenance or the like.
It might well be said that a building once constructed some
day will fall down. This, however, presupposes failure of
owners to make necessary repairs. The appellant offers
not one scintilla of evidence that repairs had ever had been
made in twenty years, or that the building was properly
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constructed even though built by a contractor, nor that the
canopy was properly and sufficiently constructed for safety,
nor that the north wall of the garage was held up by any
more than the east and west end walls and the roof, nor
what the cause of the accident might have been. A wall125
feet long and two stories high does not just collapse without exhibiting considerable indication of its weakness or
defective condition long before such collapse occurs.
The appellant has admitted by pleadings, by the evidence, and by its brief that Montell Bird was an invitee
while working on its premises, and we contend, and the
court so found, that there was never a deviation, slight or
otherwise. How can they now complain because the court
found their admissions to be true? No question of contributory negligence has been raised. No claim is made that
Montell Bird had any notice or knowledge that parking by
this wall was prohibited. Employees and other vis,itors
regularly parked in this space, and the evidence shows that
this space was not used by company trucks from early morning until after one p. m. All defendant's evidence relative
to parking is frivolous and cannot command respect.
We submit that the complaint did state a cause of action; that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient and the
defendant's evidence insufficient under all the cases, and
that the court made proper finding of fact and correctly
applied the law thereto; and that judgment should be affirmed with costs to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. SPOONER,
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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